Tuesday, June 24, 2008

The Nakbah

Compare and Contrast Abdullah and Haj amin Husseini

What are their goals?

How much are they blamed for the Nakbah?

Salibi, Abdullah and the Palestinians

  • It was made clear to Abdullah from the start that the land of Palestine would be opened to Jewish settlement; by keeping Tj purely Arab, it was hoped that this territory would serve as a place where Arabs from Palestine would go settle
  • Abdullah wanted to extend his rule to Palestine, and leave the Jews to enjoy their autonomy with all their civil rights guaranteed
  • He even tried to experiment with inviting Jews into Tj; he allowed the Palestine Electric Corporation to buy a tract of land east of Jordan for the construction of a Tj-nian plant
  • The British would not allow any land transactions to take place by Jews in Tj
  • The Husseinis had been established in Jerusalem for several centuries; they had held the title of mufti and naqib al-ashraf of Jerusalem since 1745
  • Hajj Amin al-Husseini had been educated in Ottoman governemtn schools and a Roman Catholic missionary school before being sent to Al-Azhar
  • After the Great War, he returned to Jerusalem, and became involved with resistance to British rule
  • Fled to Amman because the British were seeking his arrest, and was treated kindly by King Abdullah
  • He was convinced that the Jews were no more willing to compromise than he was and that the British counseled moderation on the Arabs because they wanted to rid themselves of the Palestine problem
  • The first outbursts of Arab resistance were not headed by the Mufti or leadership-rather, they were smaller strikes as a result of grievances and frustrations
  • Unlike other Jerusalem notables, he was able to communicate with ordinary folk and get them to accept him as champion of their cause
  • Gained recognition as the only valid spokesman for the Palestinian cause
  • Other rulers (contestors to Hajj Amin) began dealing with Abdullah
  • White Paper-Hajj Amin was not willing to negotiate because he rejected the Jewish claim to Palestine
    • Showed that he didn't really control the movement, he was simply its spokesperson

Abdullah

· Convinced that Arab aspirations would never be achieved without British compatibility

· Tried to speak on behalf of the Palestinian problem with the British, btu none of the Palestinian leaders would give him a mandate to speak on their behalf and the British government did not consider him qualified enough

· Hajj Amin and the Arab Executive Committee stepped in to adopt the revolt of 1935, but couldn't control the guerrilla fighters as the insurrection spread through the country-had to enlist Abdullah's support

· Tried to urge the British or the Jews to comply with Arab demands, but was unsuccessful; later popular discontent made Hajj Amin refuse Abdullah's help; ultimately the Arab Executive Committee had to agree to have British use force to end it

· Hajj Amin began negotiating with King Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia; tried to get Abdullah out of the Palestnian picture altogether

· Abdullah's proposition to unite Jordan and Palestine after the Peel Commission resulted in public outcry; it was believed he had cooperated with the British because he offered opening the entire region to jewish immigration

Wilson-Abdullah, Britain, and the Arab World, 1945-48

  • Bad relations with other Arab leaders
  • Even the British were unhappy with the discontent he sowed everywhere and the negative image of his own rule he was promulgating throughout the Middle East
  • Immediately after the War, Abdullah turned his attention to Syria first, initially ignoring Palestine
  • Numerous correspondences with GB, trying to prove the necessity of uniting Syria with Tj and the danger of the "Russian menace"
  • Was a spendthrift, using his control to force British officers in Jordan to agree with his financial requests
  • After the UN Special Committee on Palestine report with recommendations of partitions, Arab attention was immediately redirected towards Palestine (august 1947)
  • Partition had been proposed by the Royal Commission in 1937, and since that moment Abdullah had jumped to discreetly propose unification of TJ and Palestine
  • Back home he joined the unanimous Arab opposition to the Anglo-American report
  • Held private talks with British and American representatives, claiming that Arabs would accept partition, but only if they were not consulted beforehand
  • After the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company was looted and burned, the British realized that maybe Abdullah's proposition would be the best way to solve the Palestine issue
  • Decided to remain in the background until the Palestinians asked for help themselves

The Mufti of Jerusalem

  • Went through two phases: Palestine phase between 1917 and 1936; and the exile phase, after 1936
  • The Husayni's had a history of cooperation with the British
  • Hajj Amin wasn't really concerned much with Palestine in 1929, entrusting it to the Palestine Arab Executive
  • His role in the Western Wall dispute ahs been exaggerated
  • From 1929 to 1936 he cooperated with the British while attempting to change its policy; he was willing to accept and negotiate compromise solutions
  • White Paper: government was forced to withdraw concessions as a result of Zionist pressure; Mufti convened a General Islamic Congress to unite Muslims and Arabs in 1931; the effect of the Congress on Britain was negligible
  • Perceived the British as representing a system of fairness and justice, which is why he tried to cooperate with them for so long
  • Also thought they were to strong to oppose successfully and that eventually they would realize that their interests lay with the Arabs, not Zionists
  • In 1936 he was forced to choose between two sides: the British and the Palestinians; when the strike began in 1936, the public urged his to assume leadership
  • In 1937, the British submitted a plan to partition Palestine, and the Mufti rejected it and continued to lead the revolt
  • Britain crushed the revolt after exiling the Mufti and killed at least 3000 Palestinians; he grew bitter and uncompromising and rejected the 1939 White Paper
  • Became such a great threat that Churchill approved his assassination
  • By 1936, it had been too late to effectively resist the Zionists
  • The 1939 and 1947 rejections were missed opportunities, although it is unclear where the Palestinians would have gotten their own state, since the Zionists had an agreement with Abdullah
  • The ultimate failure was more about the balance of forces

No comments: