A Stubborn King and His Prime Minister:
The Role of King Hussein in the Failure of the Nabulsi Regime
Kamilla Khabibrakhmanova
Professor Reimer
History of Jordan and the Palestinians
Monday, December 10, 2007
On Friday, October 29, 1956, King Hussein of Jordan started an experiment in the government of his country. For the first time, he appointed his Prime Minister based on popular vote, not the personal preference of the King. This ushered in a new period of King versus the Government, which was now headed by a representative of the people, not the monarchy. The King himself, however, had not expected a great divergence between his decisions and those of the government. From the very beginning, the arrangement was hesitant at best, and the situation kept getting worse as the weeks went by. The experiment only lasted 6 months, and by May, Nabulsi’s government had been kicked out. Many attribute this to a failure of Nabulsi as a leader of his Nationalist Socialist front, but in fact, much of the blame rests on King Hussein for his unreasonable expectations of what an independent government would mean.
King Hussein’s decision to appoint Nabulsi as Prime Minister was certainly a smart move, but he was not entirely aware of what such an appointment would entail. In his memoirs, the King describes his magnanimous decision: “Nabulsi was a leftist, but even so I felt he had to have his chance.” Nabulsi, he thought, should be grateful for his title and owed the King his allegiance in return. The King had clear expectations that Nabulsi would form a government that would “cooperate” with him, or, in other words, go along with the monarch’s important decisions. At the same time, King Hussein was distrustful of the new leader and his leftist tendencies. His ties with the communists presented an immediate threat to the monarchy, which made Hussein wary of his new Government.
Nabulsi, meanwhile, had every reason to see himself as a legitimate leader of the newly formed Government. The leader of the popular Nationalist Socialist Party, he had tremendous public support from the Jordanians before, during, and after his period in office. An anti-colonialist, pro-Egyptian trend had been growing throughout the country months before Nabulsi even took office. For example, anti-French demonstrations had been held in Amman in July and the elections of October 21 resulted in a Lower House with a “powerful pro-Egyptian element.” The victory of the National Socialists and Nabulsi was simply a reflection of the popular sentiment that had already been present throughout the country. Nabulsi, as leader of the movement, was the one individual who could come closest to controlling the masses in such an environment. When tension began with Israel, the British Ambassador noted that:
“Credit for the maintenance of public order in Jordan during these critical days undoubtedly belongs to the Nabulsi government. Had a Government of the Right or a neutral caretaker Government been in office there would have very likely been an explosion of public feeling which would have put the British forces remaining at Mafraq, Ma’an and Aqaba in an awkward position, and indeed might well have done lasting damage to Anglo-Jordanian relations”
It is clear from such an analysis that the King actually owed a lot to Nabulsi, not the other way around. A continuation of caretaker governments appointed by Hussein might very well have led to popular outcry or a revolt, resulting in a real state of emergency. The King thought he had done Nabulsi a favor by giving the leftist a chance. In fact, Nabulsi may have been doing the King a greater favor than Hussein realized, by quelling the masses when the King needed to concentrate on negotiations during the Israeli crisis.
King Hussein claims that Nabulsi started aligning with the Communists almost immediately after taking office, proof that Nabulsi had never made the effort at cordial relations with the monarchy. On December 21, he says that Nabulsi made a public speech aimed at glorifying Nasser and promoting the communist cause. Then, on December 31, the Government passed a law allowing the publishing of the previously outlawed Communist newspaper Al-Jamaheer. His suspicions sufficiently aroused, the King started sending spies to Syria to try to uncover ties between the Syrian government and Nabulsi’s cabinet. The reports he received confirmed his fears. Ministers had been going to Damascus before Cabinet meetings to correspond with Ba’ath and Soviet officials. Moreover, the Jordanian officials had allegedly been bringing money over the border, into the hands of the Syrians. Despite the evidence he received, the King “never opened their bags-it is a rather serious thing to do with Ministers”. Indeed, if nothing had come of it, it would have been quite disgraceful for the King to admit to distrusting his own government.
The government and country, meanwhile, had their own reasons to distrust the King. Twenty years later, it was discovered that this period was also one of covert agreements between the King and the CIA. By 1957, the CIA was sending the King secret payments “in the millions of dollars.” The CIA later tried to explain this by claiming that the money was going to help the country financially, but it was common knowledge that the money really went to fund the King’s extravagant lifestyle. The CIA allegedly even sent young women over to keep the young King happy. Thus, while the King was complaining about his Ministers accepting bribes from the Soviets, he was at the same time engaging in the same sort of activities with the Americans, but on a much grander scale.
Nabulsi’s foreign policies aims culminated in an Egypt-Syria-Jordan-Saudi Arabian alliance that would mark the beginning of the realization of the pan-Arabist dream. Such an alliance would also have been in accordance with the popular sentiment of the time. In December 1956, Nabulsi made a speech in which he proclaimed that Jordan must be “connected militarily, economically and politically with one or more Arab states”. His plan included a federation parliament that would determine common Arab military and foreign policies, while each country’s separate local parliament would determine local matters. The plan did not seem to include a place for a monarch, which understandably cast fear into King Hussein. A similar sentiment also spread to other parts of the world, especially in the United States. The American government immediately noticed the potential for Communist infiltration through such an alliance. The fact that Nabulsi’s speech was discussed in the New York Times shows just how important of an issue this had become in the Cold War.
The Eisenhower Doctrine soon followed Nabulsi’s speech. On Tuesday, January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower read out the terms of the doctrine in Congress. In it, the United States declared its intentions to “deal with the possibility of Communist aggression, direct and indirect”, in any threatened Middle Eastern country. The aid offered was mostly to help countries out economically, so that indirect penetration of Communism was less likely. Military aid would only be provided if direct aggression made it necessary. Surprisingly, Nabulsi and most of his Cabinet were prepared to consider accepting the treaty, even though it was widely regarded as a form of anti-Communist bribery. A New York Times article of the time noted “that Minister of State Abdullah Rimawi recently made angry criticisms of the Eisenhower aid proposals. However, King Hussein and some government circles are said to favor the idea.” Later on, in February, it was reported that the Jordan Cabinet had decided to accept the Eisenhower Plan in principle, although this was followed by a denial by Rimawi. Most of the Cabinet was much more open to cooperation than King Hussein was willing to admit. The fact that a few ministers expressed discontent with the doctrine should not be seen as a reflection of the views of the Cabinet as a whole. Important treaties are rarely agreed on unanimously.
The King tended to see Nabulsi as someone who controlled the actions of his Cabinet. In reality, Nabulsi was having his own troubles in coordinating the decisions of his cabinet. He had decided to include both a Ba’ath and Communist representative in his Cabinet to represent the interests of the Jordanian people. The Ba’ath representative, Rimawi, gave him particular trouble throughout his term. By mid-January, the British had already noticed “some indications of friction within the Jordanian Government between the National Socialists on the one hand and the Ba’athists and the National Bloc (i.e. the Communists) on the other.” Thus, Nabulsi was often forced to try to find a middle ground between the King on the one hand, and the extreme Leftists, headed by Rimawi, on the other.
On Saturday, January 19, 1957, the Government of Jordan signed the Arab Solidarity Agreement with Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. This was intended to replace British aid once the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was terminated. According to the terms, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia would together contribute 12.5 million Egyptian pounds annually to help with Jordan’s development. From the very beginning, the actual implementation of the treaty was doubtful at best. Egypt and Syria were both going through economic problems of their own, no one was sure that even Saudi Arabia would come up with the 5 million pounds it promised in the treaty. Nevertheless, the government of Jordan voted unanimously to pass the agreement.
While negotiations were going on for the Arab Solidarity Agreement, Hussein was attempting to create an economic agreement with the United States. An article in the New York Times about the Arab Solidarity Agreement states: “Jordan, in another seemingly odd maneuver, last week had asked the United States for $30,000,000 in economic aid.” It seems rather surprising that Jordan was attempting to get aid from ideologically opposed states at the same time. More than likely, King Hussein was trying to bypass Nabulsi and his cabinet supporters and find an alternative to an Arab “Communist” Alliance. The United States responded that it would be impossible to consider the request until it went through an official channel-either the Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both of these posts were occupied by Nabulsi. The King had decided to send request through the Minister of Economy instead, probably because Nabulsi would have refused such a request on the eve of negotiations with the three allied Arab states. Instead of trying to negotiate with his Prime Minister, the King was trying to make his own policies in defiance with those of his Government.
The Arab Solidarity Agreement made the United States more eager to secure an alliance with Jordan. Before the agreement, the U.S. Government seemed hesitant to put forward large sums of money to help Jordan after the British stopped sending financial contributions. However, immediately after the agreement, the New York Times noted that the government saw the request for aid as in accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine and, when put through “proper channels”, it was willing to negotiate the terms. In its official comment in response to the Arab Solidarity Agreement, the U.S. government stated “that there may be nationalist and patriotic trends which are wholly free from Communist inspiration”, but “that International Communist seeks to infiltrate its agents into all movements within non-Communist countries which tend to create discord as between the free nations or weaken non-Communist governments.” Here, the United States makes it clear that it sees the Arab Solidarity Agreement as a pact between Jordan and Communist powers, one that must be contained and prevented from gaining more strength. King Hussein was succeeding in his efforts in finding a new state to sponsor Jordan after Britain left, and now all he had to do was put up a fight against Communism.
By February 1, King Hussein had already decided to get rid of his Prime Minister. A dispatch to the British government states: “The King is looking for a pretext to dismiss Nabulsi and replace him by Samir. His majesty is considering instructing Nabulsi to take a firmer line with the Communists.” The report goes on to say that the British are not in favor of the replacement, since even though “Samir is a better candidate from our [the British] point of view than Nabulsi, a change of government at this moment could be dangerous.” Clearly, the King was under no pressure from the British to get rid of his anti-British Prime Minister. His decision was his own, influenced perhaps by his growing ties with the anti-Communist U.S. government.
In March, Jordan was able to finalize the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948. Instead of lasting the twenty years the two states had originally agreed upon, the agreement had not even lasted ten. Anti-British riots had first broken out in 1955, and in October 1956, the Nabulsi government had declared its intentions of breaking ties with the British and establishing ties with Russia and/or China instead. After the Arab-Solidarity Agreement had been signed, it was only a matter of time and negotiation before the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was cancelled. However, King Hussein was not prepared to replace Britain with the Russians or China. Instead, he was trying to get the United States to take the role Britain had previously played. The Communists thus came to view the Eisenhower Doctrine as the next enemy to destroy. A British report on the issue shows Nabulsi’s reluctance to join in the cause:
“In this campaign they have scored an immediate success in that both Nabulsi and Abdullah Rimawi, the Ba’athist Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, told the crowds on March 15th that the Plan had been rejected by the Jordan Government. Nabulsi explained to me privately afterwards that in taking this line he had been trying to steal the Communists’ thunder, but the practical result, of course, if that he has seen himself obliged to follow their lead.”
A few weeks before, the members of the Jordanian Cabinet, with the exception of Rimawi, had been open to negotiating on the Eisenhower Doctrine. Even the British noted the amiability of Nabulsi’s government: “In their negotiations for the termination of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty Nabulsi and some of his colleagues showed moderation and good sense.” Nabulsi’s rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine, then, was not a part of a personal campaign to unite with the Communist front. He and his supporters were willing to cooperate with the King and the United States, but were forced to go the other way by the more extremist elements in their Cabinet. In fact, immediately after the abrogation, Nabulsi even told the British he was considering resignation, but then decided to make one last attempt at cooperation with Hussein. He submitted a proposal to the King that included actions against the Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as steps to strengthen the Jordanian economy. He stated that “if the King did not approve of it he would resign. If the King approved, he would remain in office and re-shuffle his Government probably getting rid of Rimawi, the extremist Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.” While King Hussein was looking for an excuse to get rid of Nabulsi, the Prime Minister himself was looking for ways to cooperate with the monarch and create a lasting and effective regime. With the new proposal, there seemed to be little reason for discontent from the King’s side-it promised to take actions against both Communism and the leftist troublemaker of the Cabinet, Rimawi.
The King, however, proceeded according to his previous plan and drafted a letter to Nabulsi, telling him to take a hard stance against Communist influence within Jordan. In it, he said: “We will never allow our country to be the field for a cold war which may turn to a destructive hot war if the Arabs permit others to infiltrate their ranks.” In fact, the King was doing exactly what he was claiming to be avoiding-he was forcing his country to join in the Cold War by making it take a clear anti-Communist stance. Instead of trying to negotiate the terms of the letter, the King made the letter public in an effort to garner support for the removal of the Cabinet. Nabulsi still tried to cooperate with the King and requested a meeting with him the next day. However, the King, according to his own words, “refused even to consider any changes.” It was clear that the expectations of the King and his Cabinet differed too much to allow for cooperation.
Nabulsi and his Cabinet, probably offended by the King’s stubbornness, decided to change their course of action and take more extreme measures. On April 7, they presented a list of 27 pro-Western officials they wanted to dismiss to the King for approval. One name amongst them particularly bothered the King. This was Bahjat Tabona, the Director of Security, who had been the King’s chief advisor on internal affairs. The King was now determined to get rid of Nabulsi. On April 10, he sent a letter to Nabulsi and asked him to resign. Nabulsi agreed, confident that the King would be unable to form a new government without him. Nabulsi’s continuing popularity led to “an organized flood of telegrams to the King urging him to retain Nabulsi.” The ex-Prime Minister was able to use his popularity to assist in the Zerka uprising that followed. When the King was forced to invite Nabulsi back as a member of the new Cabinet, the British forces noticed that the King had put himself in an even worse position with the popular Nationalist:
“First, the new Government will depend on Nabulsi who will thus be in a position with power without responsibility. As Prime Minister, whatever his misdeeds, he at least carried responsibility as well and this would have been bound to find him out in the long run. Secondly, the King’s continued dependence on Nabulsi, whose complicity in the military plot seems almost certain, has resulted in a lack of necessary ruthlessness in dealing with Abu Nuwar and the other ring-leaders.”
Just as Nabulsi had predicted, King Hussein could not form another government without him. In a sense, Nabulsi had won. He still had his popular support, and was now back in the Government, even if no longer as the Prime Minister. As the first popularly-elected Prime Minister, Nabulsi succeeded in showing the King certain sacrifices were necessary if democratic elements were to be introduced. The King’s stubbornness and lack of cooperation resulted in a failure because such traits are incompatible with a democratic system. Nabulsi also had issues besides a stubborn King to contend with. He had to continue to cater to popular opinion, and deal with extremists within his own Cabinet who were irritating Hussein. Nabulsi tried to act as a negotiator between the two sides, but King Hussein was unwilling to accept anything short of full cooperation. His deep mistrust of the Cabinet members from the very beginning of the term and the tensions that kept growing in the following months made the resignation that followed an inevitable outcome.
Works Cited
Baldwin, Hanson W. “Arab Federation Urged by Jordan” New York Times. 17 December 1956: 8.
Brewer, Sam Pope. “Jordan Asks U.S. For Big Rise in Aid” New York Times. 18 January 1957.
“Eisenhower responds to Saudi Arabian King Saud’s messages on the events in Jordan, the Suez Canal problem and the situation. Cable. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. SECRET. Issue Date: May 11, 1957. Date Declassified: Mar 03, 1986.
Frankland, Noble, ed. “Message from King Hussein to Sulaiman al-Nabulsi, P.M. of Jordan, 2 February 1957.” Documents on International Affars, 1957. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.
Frankland, Noble, ed. “Note from Sulaiman al-Nabulsi to the British Ambassador at Amman terminating the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance of 1948. 13 March 1957.” Documents on International Affars, 1957. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.
Frankland, Noble, ed. “Solidarity accord between Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, 19 January 1957.” Documents on International Affars, 1957. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.
Frankland, Noble, ed. “Statement by King Hussein at a press conference in Amman regarding the dismissal of Sulaiman al-Nabulsi cabinet, 30 April 1957.” Documents on International Affars, 1957. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.
H. M. King Hussein of Jordan. Uneasy Lies the Head: An Autobiography .London: Heinemann, 1962.
Jarman, Robert L., ed. Political Diaries of the Arab World: Palestine & Jordan. Volume 10: 1948-1965. Archive Editions, 2001.
Priestland, Jane, ed. Records of Jordan 1919-1965. Volume 10: 1956-1958. Archive Editions, 1996.
Schmidt, Dana Adams. “U.S. Doubts Arabs Can Provide Help Promised Jordan.” New York Times. 21 January 1957. .
Woodward, Bob. “CIA Paid Millions to Jordan’s King Hussein” The Washington Post. 18 February 1977.
U.S. Comment on the exchange of views between the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Syria. Miscellaneous. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. CONFIDENTIAL. Issue Date: Feb 3, 1957. Date Declassified: Jun 26, 1985.
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